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Looking back at the hard road to reform in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union since 1989, it
is not easy to draw up a balance sheet. It is clear
that important progress has been achieved in creat-
ing democratic institutions and transforming the
centrally planned economies into market systems,
but the economic and social cost of transition has
been much higher than anticipated. A prolonged
economic downturn, high levels of unemployment,
sharply reduced social security, widening income
and wealth differences, falling health standards and
the rise of organised crime, have all contributed to
frustration, disillusion and mounting political ten-
sions. As a result, the current mood among the
Eastern European populations is very different
from the enthusiasm and hope which were raised
by the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989.
The dramatic divergence between expectations and
reality has probably been the single most important
factor behind the recent turnaround in the political
and social climate in the region. Among economists
and policymakers there is an almost universal con-
sensus that the recession has been much deeper
and longer than initially expected, and that the
transformation has not yet delivered on many of its
promises.
I Infant capitalism?
lt cannot be denied that the Eastern European
countries have gone a long way since they started
their transition to capitalism. Democratic and plu-
ralistic political systems have been established in
all of them and there is little question of reversing
the trend towards the market economy The
straightjacket of central planning and state controls
was dismantled: prices have been liberalised,
domestic currencies are convertible, consumers
and producers are essentially free to make deci-
sions according to their preferences. Inflation has
been greatly reduced and endemic shortages elimi-
nated. A large part of output is now produced in a
dynamic private sector, and domestic markets offer
a large variety of goods and services, comparable to
that in Western countries. According to official
national statistics, the non-state sectors share in
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gross domestic product (GDP) already exceeds 50
per cent in most countries, an indicator of the enor-
mous distance they have covered since 1989 when
the share was generally less than 5 per cent. Even if
these statistics must be treated with some caution,
because the rules of statistical reporting and sectoral
classification are not always clear and consistent,
the radical change in the ownership structure is
clearly evident.
The governments of transition countries have also
made considerable progress in integrating their
economies into the global market economy: most of
their foreign trade is now conducted with devel-
oped market economies at international prices and
in convertible currencies, and their international
links have been further strengthened by inflows of
foreign direct and portfolio investment. Many new
market institutions have been established and
developed, such as stock exchanges, monetary and
credit instruments, anti-monopolistic regulations,
bankruptcy legislation, etc. By the end of 1994,
most Eastern European economies had passed the
low point of the economic recession, and the long-
awaited recovery appeared to be under way
But all the achievements notwithstanding, there
have also been failures and disappointments; in
fact, after five years, capitalism in the transition
economies was still in its infancy: growing fast, but
still immature and turbulent.
2 Transitional recession: too
deep, too long
Perhaps the most disturbing and unexpected out-
come of the 1989 revolutions was the transitional
recession which depressed output and employment
well below pre-transition levels. The official statis-
tics show that the cumulative contraction of output
between 1989 and 1993 in the transition
economies was on a massive scale and unprece-
dented since the Great Depression of 1929-33. The
recession was particularly dramatic in Bulgaria and
Romania, the two Eastern European countries com-
monly considered as being the least prepared for
market reforms, and in nearly all the countries of
the former Soviet Union. Another common feature
is that the cumulative fall of (gross) industrial
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output was larger, generally by more than a half,
than the fall of gross domestic product (GDP), and
by the end of 1993 it exceeded 50 per cent in the
worst cases (Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Ukraine
and the Baltic states).
What was surprising about the recession was not
the fall of output itself, because some recession had
indeed been anticipated, but rather that it was so
deep, so widespread and so persistent, and that the
subsequent adjustment on the supply side was so
weak. Official forecasts which accompanied the
launching of the stabilisation-cum-reform pro-
grammes typically predicted a temporary and rela-
tively mild contraction of output, followed by a
strong recovery fuelled by efficiency gains, the
expansion of private business activities, and inflows
of foreign investment. In reality, however, the
behaviour of output followed an L-shaped pattern,
instead of a U-shaped one.
A number of possible explanations of the transi-
tional recession have been suggested over the last
few years.2 They range from Keynesian demand-
deficiency to Schumpeterian institutional interpre-
tations, from concepts of structural rigidities and
distortions typical of Soviet-type economies to
views regarding the recession as a statistical artefact.
None of them is fully convincing, but considered
jointly they allow for some conclusions.
First, it should be noted that the recession was real
and not imaginary: while there seems to be no
doubt that the official statistics do tend to overesti-
mate the extent of the actual fall in output, it may
also be argued that the margin of error is probably
smaller than commonly believed (Rosati 1994).
Second, the recession was the joint outcome of a
combination of factors working both from the
demand and supply sides; but the adverse impact of
stabilisation programmes on domestic demand
appears to be quite substantial. With the benefit of
hindsight, it can be argued that the stabilisation
policies were probably too restrictive, as they were
guided by a mistaken judgment of the initial degree
of macro-economic disequilibrium. Third, it might
have been expected that the shift away from
communism would release large efficiency gains
which would generally work in favour of output
See, for example, Chadha et al. (1993), Kornai (1993) and Blanchard et al. (1991).
expansion rather than contraction (Leibenstein
1978: 17-38); that these gains have not maten-
alised underlines the excessive optimism that pre-
vailed in 1989 as to the responsiveness of the
supply side of the transition economies. Whether
micro-supply responses could have been stronger
with a different set of policies is an open question.
3 StructuraI unemployment
lt is a well established proposition of traditional
comparative economics that the near-full employ-
ment levels observed under central planning were
artificially achieved because of low work discipline,
an ideological commitment to full employment,
and low wages. Large-scale lay-offs during the tran-
sition were therefore predicted, but it was also
assumed that rapidly increasing demand for labour
in the expanding service and private business sec-
tors would absorb most of the excess manpower in
industry, and that unemployment would remain
moderate. In reality, the jobless rate in most Eastern
European countries is well over 10 per cent of the
labour force and has remained high, despite the
emerging recovery of output.
An important message from labour market statistics
is that not only are unemployment rates high in the
transition economies, but also that there has been
only a small reduction in excess employment (as
indicated by the difference between the cumulative
change in GDP and the cumulative change in
employment). In Bulgaria, Slovenia, Hungary and
Poland employment levels have fallen broadly in
line with the fall of output, thus leaving the initial
level of overemployment practically unchanged; in
all the other countries, but especially in the former
Soviet republics and Yugoslavia, the level of
overemployment has increased, with obviously neg-
ative implications for labour productivity and
wages.
Since the major reason for high unemployment has
been the transitional recession, the recovery might
in principle have been expected to at least alleviate
the problem. Unfortunately, the emerging recovery
cannot be counted on to radically improve the
labour market situation, because the flow of new
jobs is likely to be broadly offset by new entrants to
the pool of unemployed coming from schools, an
overmanned agricultural sector and shrinking state
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enterprises. As a result, the transition countries are
likely to have to live with double-digit unemploy-
ment rates for several years to come.
Not only is the economy likely to suffer from the
waste of manpower resources, but social and polit-
ical stability may be endangered if too many people
are unemployed for too long.
4 Persistent inflation
High rates of inflation and widespread shortages
were characteristic of the final days of the central
planning system. Liberalisation of prices and the
initial devaluation of domestic currencies further
added to inflationary pressures; in fact, the correc-
tive inflation in most countries strongly overshot
the levels envisaged in the stabilisation pro-
grammes. To restore fundamental price stability was
thus one of the central objectives of the reformist
governments. Experience has shown that reducing
inflation from near hyperinflation levels to manage-
able proportions is a relatively easy task, and can be
done quickly with standard measures of financial
restraint implemented within a credible and consis-
tent programme. However, most of the Eastern
European countries which have succeeded in low-
ering inflation to 20-40 per cent per annum, seem
to be finding it very difficult to reduce it further to
one-digit rates.
The persistence of inflation at so-called moderate
levels cannot be explained easily with standard the-
ories. The growth of money supply does not seem
to have been a primary inflationary factor, because
it has generally lagged behind the consumer price
index in all Eastern European countries (except the
Czech Republic where, however, inflation is the
lowest in the region), and even more so in Russia
and the other Commonwealth of Independent
States countries. Also, there is no uniform pattern
in the impact of budget deficits: although there
seems to be a clear link between fiscal deficits and
inflation in Russia and ini Ukraine, the evidence is
less clear for Eastern European countries. Wages
have been kept under control throughout the
region, generally increasing less than consumer
prices.
The nature of the current inflation appears to be dif-
ferent from that observed in the initial stages of the
transition, when the liberalisation shocks, excess
demand, and monetisation of fiscal deficits played
the most important roles. Moderate inflation seems
to be caused chiefly by inertial mechanisms, such as
various indexation schemes for wages and pen-
sions, frequent foreign exchange rate adjustments,
periodic increases of key commodity prices (mostly
energy and food), and inflationary expectations.
Attempts to stop such inflation with the standard
instruments of tight monetary policy tend not to be
very effective, especially when inflows of short-term
capital boost the domestic money supply under
pegged exchange rates (Czech Republic, Poland). A
conservative monetary policy is still needed, but it
should be combined with other measures which
would dampen inflationary expectations through
the breaking up of inertial mechanisms.
5 Enterprise reform and
privatisation
Policymakers in the transition economies were
clearly aware of the systemic weaknesses of tradi-
tional state enterprises and seem to have recognised
that, unreformed, they were likely to behave in a
perverse way in a market environment. In the initial
stage, these dangers were to be avoided through
rigid tax-based incomes policies, and thereafter
through privatisation. And yet the composition of
the stabilisation packages in most countries sug-
gests that they were based on an implicit assump-
tion that the reaction pattern of state enterprises to
stabilisation measures would be broadly similar to
that observed in developed market economies. This
may help to explain the lack of early reforms of state
enterprises and banks, and the slow pace of privati-
sation. Indeed, instead of discontinuing inefficient
production, laying off excessive manpower and
responding to market signals in a standard, profit-
maximising way, state enterprises preferred to raise
prices, protect employment and lobby heavily for
government support and assistance.
From the economic perspective, the role of privati-
sation was to introduce efficient corporate gover-
nance and additional sources of funding for
enterprises; in addition, and in many cases primar-
ily, it was seen as an important underpinning of the
political transformation. Very broadly, two different
privatisation strategies were followed: one based on
the free distribution of state assets to the public at
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large; the other following a case-by-case commercial
approach. In the first case, the transfer of ownership
rights can be carried out relatively fast, and the
share of the non-state sector in the economy is
expanded at the stroke of a pen. However, the main
advantage of this method is essentially its speed: as
for the economic objectives of privatisation, it takes
much longer for effective corporate governance to
be established. A good illustration of the problem is
provided by the results of privatisation in the Czech
Republic. Even though the state managed to divest
itself of more than half its industrial property within
less than three years, the behaviour of enterprises
has in fact changed little if at all, because the new
owners are either dispersed or, if they hold strategic
stakes, are unable to exert the desired influence on
managers because of a lack of information, conflict
of interest or general passivity The privatised enter-
prises are thus non-state, but they are not yet fully
private. Moreover, only limited funds have been
channelled to enterprises as a result of this method
of privatisation.
Under the second strategy, when a state enterprise
is sold to a new owner (owners), corporate gover-
nance is immediately established, additional financ-
ing is often forthcoming, and the necessary
adjustments begin to follow; but since the strategy
proceeds case by case, it takes a long time to priva-
tise a majority of state enterprises. The dilemma is
therefore to choose between a wide and shallow pri-
vatisation, or a deep and narrow one. Whatever
alternative is selected, the process of economic
restructuring will take years to complete.
One important lesson that can be drawn from expe-
rience is that a mixed strategy may be desirable,
combining elements of free distribution and com-
mercial sales. Another is that the rate at which cor-
porate governance can effectively be established in
newly privatised enterprises should be an important
consideration determining the speed of the privati-
sation process. As proper governance cannot be
achieved overnight, a large number of enterprises
will have to stay and operate under non-private
ownership for some time.
6 Banking reform
The need to overhaul the whole financial sector in
the transition economies was only fully recognised
when the banks and other financial institutions
emerged as a major obstacle to the process of
reform. The main weaknesses of the financial sector
include: the absence of many important institutions
of financial intermediation; the small capital base of
the existing commercial banks; the excessive
dependence of banks on a limited number of clients
(mainly large state enterprises); lack of experience
in credit operations; and either absent or inade-
quate prudential regulations and bank supervision,
However, policymakers did not seem to fully realise
that the reform of the financial system was not only
an integral component in the creation of a market
economy, but that it should have been initiated at
the very beginning of the transformation process.
The failure to reform the financial sector at the start
of the transition has had a number of important
implications. The most important is probably the
rapid accumulation of bad loans in the commercial
banks, a phenomenon common to all the transition
countries. Some of the bad loans are an inheritance
from the regime of central planning, when state
enterprises were largely unconstrained in their
investment activities, but much more significant are
those accumulated during the transition period.
The latter resulted from a lack of appropriate
adjustment by enterprises and banks to the sudden
change in the macro-economic environment.
Protracted recession and the collapse of traditional
export markets in former Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (Comecon) countries also led
to many technical and actual insolvencies in the
enterprise sector.
7 Foreign investments
From the very beginning of the transition process,
the governments of both Western countries and
Eastern European countries regarded foreign direct
investment as playing a key role in the restructuring
and transformation of the former centrally planned
economies. The initial optimism surrounding the
role of FDI was based essentially on a number of
perceived characteristics of the transition
economies: an abundance of cheap skilled labour,
geographical proximity to Western markets, the
anticipation of a rapid growth of internal demand
and liberal commercial legislation.
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The balance after five years of transition looks
rather modest. The actual volume of FDI in transi-
tion economies has been much lower than expected
and, in addition, has been very unevenly distrib-
uted across countries. Apart from a few large invest-
ments in the early 1990s, foreign investment has
tended to be hesitant and on a small scale.
One possible explanation of this outcome is that
foreign investors picked up the best companies in
Eastern Europe, in terms of their market potential,
expected profits and the risks involved, and are not
in a hurry to invest in other, typically more debt-
ridden and overstaffed, companies. But a more gen-
eral explanation for the reticence of foreign
investors is probably linked to more general sys-
temic factors, such as the uncertain legal, political
and institutional environment.
Apart from limited inflows of FDI, its distribution
may also be sometimes questionable. Casual obser-
vation and case studies suggest that FDI often tends
to concentrate in sectors and branches with a rela-
tively high potential for rent-seeking, which may
arise from quasi-monopolistic positions or from
special arrangements with the host governments of
transition countries. Thus, foreign investment in
Eastern European car manufacturing was typically
made conditional on the granting of special privi-
leges to investors in the form of high customs tariffs
(in Poland for example).
8 The need for structural reforms
Despite marked differences in the history and rates
of advance of market reform and in current macro-
economic performance, the transition countries of
Eastern Europe display many similarities. Most of
them have made considerable progress towards sta-
bilising their economies, strengthening their
domestic currencies and developing a strong and
dynamic private sector. They have also managed to
reorient much of their trade from the depressed
Eastern markets to the more competitive markets of
Western Europe. But these successes notwithstand-
ing, the Eastern European countries also face some
common problems which, if not addressed in an
appropriate way, may hamper the economic recov-
ery and even lead to political instability in the
region. In particular, they are all confronted with
essentially the same task of a massive reconstruction
of their productive capacities, a task which includes
a substantial reallocation of resources and probably
the closing down of many inefficient enterprises. In
this context, the slow pace of structural reforms
raises serious concern. The implications, actual or
anticipated, of restructuring for the distribution of
income and wealth are a cause of bitter political
infighting in most transition countries, which is also
a factor slowing the progress of reforms. Improving
the working of an inefficient and underdeveloped
financial sector is also taking a great deal of time
and effort, and the burden of bad debts has negative
repercussions on the ability of the commercial
banks to finance the enterprise sector.
As argued above, the economic performance of the
Eastern European transition countries will also
depend heavily on continued export expansion if
overdependence on foreign capital is to be avoided
or, since the latter seems unlikely to be available in
significant amounts anyway, if the balance of pay-
ments is not to be a constraint on growth. Given the
need for imports of new technology to support the
restructuring process, an expanding capacity to
import will therefore largely depend on the growth
of exports. The positive impact of exports on
growth may, however, be extended and strength-
ened if better access to Western European markets
is granted for the transition countries, and this in
turn may encourage an outward-looking EDI which
can have a useful role to play in expanding exports
over the longer term. But export growth can also be
supported by export promotion efforts.
The other major constraint on growth is the rela-
tively low rate of domestic savings, which limits the
potential for domestically financed investment. This
is not only due to the currently low level of per
capita incomes in these countries. (It is worth not-
ing that a considerable part of the household sav-
ings accumulated in the pre-transition period was
wiped out by inflation and exchange rate changes.)
Policies to encourage more savings are urgently
needed in the transition countries. In this context,
real positive interest rates on bank deposits are an
important but not sufficient incentive. A variety of
attractive and secure savings instruments needs to
be developed, such as mutual funds, pension funds,
bonds and equity shares. Also, accessibility of more
expensive goods (consumer durables, housing)
could be increased through the development of
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financial instruments, allowing people to save a
larger proportion of their incomes in order to
finance long-term purchases and investments
(mortgages, consumer credits, and so on).
Economic prospects will also depend on the politi-
cal developments in the transition economies. In
this context, an important question is whether the
almost universal shift of political support away from
economic liberalism and political conservatism,
which dominated the early years of transition, has
implications for the direction and pace of economic
reform. The shift of political power to the social
democratic left started in Lithuania and in Poland in
1993, was followed by similar political changes in
Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia in 1994 and, in
early 1995, in Estonia. While most of the new gov-
ernments displayed somewhat less enthusiasm for
rapid, or spontaneous, privatisation (and, indeed,
the pace of ownership transfers slowed down in
some countries) there seems to be little question
about their genuine commitment to continue with
the process of market transformation and democra-
tic reforms. But it is important to underline the
problems facing these governments. After five years
of reform, considerable progress has been made in
transforming economies and political institutions,
and in many of them the first signs of a recovery in
output have appeared. Many people in Eastern
Europe are benefiting considerably from this
progress, especially the educated young, the skilled
and those with entrepreneurial drive. But there are
also many losers, especially the old, the unskilled,
those employed by the state and many of those in
the professions. Their growing discontent is now a
factor that no government in Eastern Europe can
ignore, and if their numbers continue to ïncrease,
then both social stability and the commitment to
continued reform is likely to be undermined.
10 Conclusion
In 1989-90, the countries of Eastern Europe enthu-
siastically embraced the capitalist model of eco-
nomic organisation. But since then, reservations
have emerged and grown large, mainly because of
the unexpected social and economic costs of transi-
tion and slow improvement in living standards.
These reservations pose important challenges to
policymakers: they call for imaginative domestic
policies aimed at sustaining economic growth,
checking and reversing the rising trend in
unemployment, and speeding up the necessary
structural change, while maintaining financial disci-
pline and macro-economic stability For political
leaders, the current mood of disillusion creates a
strong temptation to resort to populist measures,
which could have disastrous economic conse-
quences. Finally, popular reservations about the
market reforms also pose a serious challenge to the
international community, which should read them
not simply as symptoms of impatience and naïveté
on the part of Eastern European populations, but as
the reflection of real social distress and, often, dis-
orientation, conditions which call for more, not
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